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Emancipation from Work or Emancipation through Work? 
 Aesthetics of Work and Idleness in Recent French Thought 
 
 
In his Le Capitalisme cognitif (2007), Yann Moulier Boutang argues that we have now 
entered a new mode of capitalist accumulation, in which surplus value is no longer 
primarily derived by exploiting the physical labour of the Fordist assembly-line worker. 
Rather, in this Post-Fordist conjuncture the extraction of surplus value demands the 
exploitation and implication of contemporary workers’ cognitive, affective, and 
cooperative capacities in their productive activities. Under Fordism, assembly-line 
workers were compelled to perform a series of mindless, repetitive tasks, tasks that 
were ‘parcellised’ in accordance with the precepts of Taylorist ‘scientific management’ 
and hence demanded little in the way of initiative, creativity, cooperation, or even 
communication between co-workers. Under Post-Fordism, by contrast, those creative, 
cooperative, and communicative capacities come to the fore, whether in an expanded 
tertiary sector or in a modernised manufacturing sector, characterised by techniques of 
Just-in-Time production and Total Quality Management that require workers to invest 
ever greater levels of personal initiative in their tasks. As a result, Moulier Boutang 
suggests, ‘le capitalisme cognitif cherche désormais ses modèles du côté de l’art et de 
l’Université’.1 In ‘cognitive capitalism’, then, work will engage the worker’s affects and 
intellect to such a degree as to become analogous to artistic or intellectual production, a 
form of productive activity that, like the aesthetic object, finds an end in itself. 
 In drawing this analogy between ‘cognitive capitalism’ and the realm of art, Moulier 
Boutang is echoing Paolo Virno’s claim, in his Grammar of the Multitude (2004), that 
under Post-Fordism ‘virtuosity’ or ‘virtuosic performance’ have become the keys to the 
extraction of surplus value.2 Virno returns to Marx’s definition in Capital of a sub-
category of waged labour that produces no separable end product, the kind of labour 
engaged in by pianists, butlers, dancers, teachers, priests, and medical doctors. This 
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kind of labour, which depends on the presence of others and finds its own fulfilment in 
itself, demands, Virno (GoM, p.61) argues, the sort of ‘virtuosic performance’ that has 
now become characteristic of the affective, cognitive labour that is key to Post-Fordist 
accumulation: ‘in the post-Ford era, activity without an end product, previously a special 
and problematic case, […] becomes the prototype of all waged labour’. Inasmuch as such 
‘virtuosity’ remains subservient to the wage relation, Virno (GoM, p.68) maintains that 
‘virtuosic activity shows itself as universal servile work’. Yet, Moulier Boutang insists that 
however effective capitalism appears to be in extracting surplus value from the 
cognitive, communicative, and affective capacities of its wage slaves, there remains 
something within those capacities that may yet prove irreducible to capitalist 
exploitation, something that constitutes ‘un défi sans précédent pour l’entreprise, le 
marché et l’Etat, ainsi que pour les formes de la démocratie représentative’ (Cc, p.166). 
Thus both Virno’s and Moulier Boutang’s accounts of the ‘virtuosic’ character of work 
under ‘cognitive capitalism’ are haunted by the possibility that, in seeking to integrate 
such irreducibly human capacities into its regime of accumulation, capitalism may yet 
prove to be its own gravedigger, unwittingly hastening the advent of some new Aesthetic 
State in which work will truly be modelled on the aesthetic, finding its own end in itself. 
  
Neo-operaism’s Aesthetics of Work 
Moulier Boutang and Virno both belong to that broad current in Marxism known as ‘neo-
operaism’, whose best-known text is Michael Hardt and Toni Negri’s Empire (2000) and 
whose most influential manifestation in the French context is the journal Multitudes, of 
which Moulier Boutang is General Editor. As its name suggests, neo-operaism is a more 
recent iteration of the Italian ‘operaïste’ or ‘workerist’ current of the 1960s and 70s. A 
founding assumption of operaism is what Mario Tronti famously termed ‘the inversion of 
perspective’, whereby the primary motor of history is taken to be not the development of 
capitalism according to its own autonomous logic but rather the productive force of the 
working class itself. Thus, for example, operaists understand Fordism to be less the 
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product of technological and economic developments per se than the response of capital 
to the continuing autonomy of independent artisanal or semi-artisanal forms of labour. 
By drafting and disciplining massed workers into the Fordist factory, by rigidly separating 
command from execution and breaking productive tasks down into a series of mindless, 
unthinking, and non-communicative actions, capital was thus able to capture and control 
the workers’ inherent productive force, rendering that force amenable to economic 
exploitation. In so doing, however, capitalism was forced to integrate into itself a force 
antagonistic to its own interests. That antagonism manifested itself in the phenomenon 
of workers’ refusal, in the strikes, slow-downs, or acts of sabotage by which the workers 
demonstrated that it was in fact they who were the true motor force behind capital 
accumulation and economic development.3 
 Neo-operaists would, by extension, understand the strikes and protests of May 1968 
as a mass refusal of the discipline of Fordism, in the name of greater freedom, autonomy 
and initiative in the workplace and across society as a whole. Post-Fordist modes of 
production would then be understood as capitalism’s enforced response to the 
movements of 1968 and after, in the form of attempts to integrate that desire for 
greater autonomy into the process of capitalist accumulation itself, in a new ‘apparatus 
of capture’ that rendered workers’ autonomous productive power controllable and 
exploitable once more. Typically, neo-operaists read this shift from Fordist to Post-
Fordist modes of production in terms of the shift between Foucault’s ‘disciplinary society’ 
and what Gilles Deleuze termed an emergent ‘society of control’, characterised by less 
overtly coercive, more ‘modulated’ but nonetheless exploitative apparatuses of power.4 
Despite this engagement with Foucault and Deleuze, neo-operaists continue to adhere to 
a fundamentally dialectical conception of history, positing the affective and cognitive 
capacities now integrated into ‘cognitive capitalism’ as a force of negativity that contains 
the seeds of some future emancipation, in ways that our discussion of Moulier Boutang 
and Virno should have made clear. 
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 It is this continuing adherence to a dialectical conception of history that Jacques 
Rancière has criticised. In a comment on Hardt and Negri’s Empire that is equally 
applicable to Moulier Boutang’s work, he casts doubt on this assumption that the new 
mode of production ‘serait voué à exploser sous l’effet même des nouvelles forces 
productives qu’il développe et qui portent en elles-mêmes un nouveau monde social’. He 
continues: ‘Cette thèse n’a jamais été confirmée par le développement du capitalisme, 
qui a toujours avalé les technologies qui devaient le faire exploser’. In the face of this 
historical failure of the Marxist dialectic to work itself out in the way its adherents 
predict, Rancière suggests that genuine emancipation must be sought elsewhere, 
‘ailleurs que dans l’organisation capitaliste des forces de production: dans la multiplicité 
anonyme des affirmations de la capacité de n’importe qui’.5 By an apparent paradox, 
Rancière finds in the aesthetic a model for this other form of emancipation, for this scene 
where everyone and anyone can manifest an equal capacity. However, in stark contrast 
to Moulier Boutang, he understands the aesthetic as corresponding to a moment of 
‘idleness’, in which any logic of productive labour is ‘suspended’, allowing workers to 
glimpse an identity and a destiny for themselves different to that defined by their place 
in the relations of production.  
 As we have noted, Moulier Boutang appears to hold out the promise of emancipation 
through a kind of ‘aesthetics of work’, in which the new cognitive worker will achieve 
freedom by re-appropriating her alienated cognitive and affective capacities, such that 
work may find an end in itself and hence become analogous to aesthetic experience. 
From Rancière’s point of view, this would amount to merely the latest iteration of an 
‘ethical’ conception of aesthetics that threatens to suppress the ‘dissensual’ nature of the 
aesthetic in favour of a new consensual community of feeling. Thus, to Moulier Boutang’s 
‘aesthetics of work’, Rancière will oppose what we might term an ‘aesthetics of idleness’, 
in which the aesthetic is taken to figure not some future harmonious community but an 
egalitarian moment that disrupts or suspends any such community. In what follows, this 
article will examine Rancière’s ‘aesthetic of idleness’ in more detail, clarifying its 
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distinction from any ‘ethical’ conception of art or aesthetics. It will then consider the 
most frequent criticism that Rancière’s work has attracted, namely that his focus on such 
fleeting moments of disruption or suspense is unrealistic or idealistic, a ‘fantasy’, to 
quote one recent critic,6 that wilfully ignores the material determinants of lasting political 
action. This, finally, will involve turning to the most recent work of Maurizio Lazzarato. 
Formerly a collaborator of Moulier Boutang’s and a member of the editorial board of 
Multitudes, over the last few years Lazzarato has distanced himself from the neo-
operaist focus on diagnosing the economic forms and political possibilities of ‘cognitive 
capitalism’. For Lazzarato, the defining characteristic of the contemporary economic 
conjuncture is less the exploitation of workers’ affective and cognitive capacities than the 
use of debt as a generalized mechanism of social control and economic exploitation. As a 
corollary to this, he has been forced to seek alternative paths to emancipation than that 
supposedly offered by the promise of a collective re-appropriation of those cognitive and 
affective capacities. This, in turn, has led him to place a renewed emphasis on the 
refusal of work as a primary political tactic, yet this is a notion of refusal that bears the 
traces of a significant engagement with Rancière’s thought. In this sense, Lazzarato 
seems to have joined Rancière in suggesting that any political emancipation will have to 
take the form of an emancipation from work, rather than an emancipation through 
work.7 
 
Rancière’s Aesthetics of Idleness 
Rancière’s rejection of any dream of emancipation through the collective re-
appropriation of workers’ productive capacities is not purely theoretical, it is also rooted 
in his archival studies of the nineteenth-century French workers movement. In La Nuit 
des prolétaires (1981), he offers numerous of examples of workers who, in fact, rejected 
any dream of re-appropriating the efforts and products of their labours, any dream of 
emancipation through labour. The texts authored by the worker-poets and philosophers 
he studies show a keen understanding that to re-appropriate the products of one’s 
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labours by having a greater personal investment in and rational understanding of the 
production process offers no form of emancipation at all. Rather, what this promises is 
an even more profound form of servitude in that not only the workers’ physical force but 
also their intellectual and affective capacities will now be exploited and expropriated. To 
quote Rancière: ‘la qualification de la tâche qui fait que l’esprit est occupé avec le corps, 
ne saurait faire compensation à la douleur du travail pour vivre. Elle la renforce au 
contraire quand elle fait mordre le temps de la servitude nécessaire sur le temps de la 
liberté possible’.8  
 In rejecting this long-standing dream of ‘la belle harmonie d’une intelligence attentive 
servie par une main habile’ (Nuit, p.71), Rancière’s worker-intellectuals rub up against 
various forms of utopian socialism, displacing, by their words and actions, those 
doctrines’ belief that emancipation would come from some form of rationalisation or re-
appropriation of the processes and products of labour. In seeking emancipation 
elsewhere, through a ‘suspension’ of the logic of work, these proletarian philosophers 
staged a ‘rupture’ with their presumed identities and destinies as workers, laying claim 
to a fundamental equality and right to freedom contingent on their status as human 
beings. Rancière finds a theoretical model for these moments of emancipation through 
‘rupture’, ‘dissensus’, and ‘suspension’ of the logic of labour in the founding texts of 
modern aesthetics. He thus offers an interpretation of the political potential of the 
aesthetic that seems directly opposed to what we have termed Moulier Boutang’s 
‘aesthetics of work’. Exemplary here would be the case of the carpenter Gabriel Gauny, 
who recounts momentarily stepping back from his labours installing the parquet floor of 
a bourgeois residence to engage in a moment of leisurely, idle, disinterested aesthetic 
contemplation of the view from the window of the room in which he was working (Nuit, 
p.91). Acting for a moment as if the house belonged to him and not his bourgeois 
master, as if it were the site not of exploitation but of aesthetic appreciation, Gauny 
unwittingly realised Kant’s prescriptions for leisurely aesthetic contemplation, for the 
appreciation of the Beautiful.  
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 For Kant, aesthetic appreciation demands a ‘leisurely’, ‘disinterested’ gaze that 
attends purely to the form of the aesthetic object, ignoring any consideration of its 
function. It is because of its disinterestedness that aesthetic appreciation can lay claim 
to the universality of its judgements of taste, to their universal communicability. In the 
absence of such disinterest, judgements of taste remain narrowly particular, reflecting 
an individual’s purely personal appetites or partial interests. In suspending his labours to 
appreciate the view from the window on disinterested aesthetic terms, Gauny 
experiences a moment of equality and a promise of emancipation – equality through 
appreciating the universal communicability of a Beauty available to everyone, regardless 
of their social status; emancipation by staging a rupture with the dominant distribution 
of social roles and places, what Rancière terms ‘le partage du sensible’, to lay claim to a 
capacity to feel, do, and be something else than what his identity as ‘worker’ prescribes 
for him. 
 If Rancière finds in Kant’s Third Critique the first philosophical elaboration of the 
emancipatory potential of the aesthetic, he locates a more overtly political interpretation 
of that potential in Schiller’s later On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Writing in the 
shadow of the Terror, Schiller adopts Kant’s conception of the aesthetic as a mediating 
term between the different human faculties, between unmediated desire or sensation, on 
the one hand, and disembodied reason, understanding, or moral obligation, on the other.  
He argues that if the French Revolution has taken a wrong turn, this is because the 
revolutionaries have continued to submit the faculties of desire, sense, and feeling to the 
hegemony of reason. The aesthetic, understood in Kantian terms as a mediating force 
between desire and reason, thus offers the promise of a more harmonious ‘free play’ 
between these faculties, in which the hierarchy according to which reason dominates 
feeling would be suspended and genuine freedom achieved. Rancière identifies Schiller’s 
analysis of a statue of a Greek goddess, the Juno Ludovisi, as this aesthetic’s ‘scène 
primitive’.9  
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 For Schiller, the beauty of the Juno Ludovisi reflects the ‘idleness and indifferency’ of 
the goddess’s countenance, the fact that her expression is free of ‘all the earnestness 
and effort which furrow the cheeks of mere mortals, no less than the empty pleasures 
which preserve the smoothness of a vacuous face’. Idle, because freed from ‘the bonds 
inseparable from every purpose, every duty, every care’, the goddess’s countenance 
embodies that ‘happy medium between the realm of law and the sphere of physical 
exigency’ that defines the aesthetic. The aesthetic corresponds to that ‘free play’ 
between the faculties that Schiller also terms the ‘play drive’, that state in which, thanks 
to the suspension of the hierarchy of reason over sense, any human becomes ‘fully a 
human being’, truly free. Through its combination of idleness and self-containment, the 
Juno Ludovisi thus inspires in viewers a mixture of ‘utter repose and supreme agitation’, 
hence moving them to create in reality ‘the freest, most sublime state of being’ that the 
statue figures aesthetically.10 To quote Rancière: 
 
Pourquoi la statue de la déesse nous attire-t-elle et nous repousse-t-elle en même 
temps? Parce qu’elle manifeste ce caractère de la divinité qui est aussi, dit Schiller, 
celui de la pleine humanité: elle ne travaille pas, elle joue. Elle ne cède ni ne 
résiste. Elle est libre des liens du commandement comme de l’obéissance. Or, cet 
état d’harmonie s’oppose clairement à celui qui gouverne les sociétés humaines et 
qui met chacun à sa place en séparant ceux qui commandent et ceux qui 
obéissent, les hommes du loisir et ceux du travail, les hommes de la culture 
raffinée et ceux de la simple nature. Le sens commun dissensuel de l’expérience 
esthétique s’oppose alors aussi bien au consensus de l’ordre traditionnel qu’à celui 
que la Révolution française a tenté d’imposer. (Malaise, p.132) 
 
 Kant and Schiller thus provide Rancière with philosophical accounts of the 
emancipatory potential of the aesthetic under what he terms ‘le regime esthétique de 
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l’art’. This ‘aesthetic regime’, he argues, emerged at the end of the eighteenth century, 
in the wake of the European democratic revolutions, staging a break with the ‘régime’ or 
‘ordre représentatif’ that preceded it. The ‘representative regime’ was based on a 
hierarchy of genres and subjects that assumed an organic relationship between the 
social status of fictional characters or represented subjects, the characteristics they 
embodied, and the actions that expressed that status and those characteristics. The 
‘aesthetic regime’, by contrast, develops ‘comme une interminable rupture avec ce 
modèle hiérarchique du corps, de l’histoire et de l’action. Le peuple libre est, dit Schiller, 
le peuple qui joue, le peuple incarné dans cette activité qui suspend l’opposition même 
de l’actif et du passif’.11 For Rancière, then, the aesthetic is emancipatory inasmuch as it 
corresponds to a moment of idleness, a ‘rupture’ in or ‘suspension’ of any logic of work 
or productive activity. This aesthetic of idleness represents a form of ‘dissensus’ insofar 
as it exemplifies the capacity of workers, women, immigrants, or slaves to be something 
other, to occupy another place, to achieve another destiny than that allotted them in the 
conventional, consensual distribution of places and roles, the existing ‘partage du 
sensible’.  
 As we have seen, Rancière finds a philosophical account of this ‘dissensual’ aesthetic 
experience in the works of Kant and Schiller. He finds empirical, historical evidence of 
this aesthetic at work in the attempts of nineteenth-century worker-intellectuals to 
escape their allotted identities and destinies by following paths similar to that proposed 
by Gabriel Gauny, for whom ‘le problème n’est pas de posséder “son” objet mais de se 
posséder, de développer des forces que rien ne puisse plus satisfaire des présents que 
l’exploitation offre à la servilité. […] Le royaume de Baal ne sera renversé que par 
l’armée des déserteurs qui auront appris à mettre leur coeur là où est leur trésor: 
ailleurs, nulle part, partout’ (Nuit, p.95). Finally, Rancière finds a variety of fictional 
representations of this relationship between dissensus, idleness, and the aesthetic in a 
number of the novels, films, and artworks he interprets.  
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 One striking example is offered by his reading of the fate of Julien Sorel, ostensibly 
the most active of literary heroes, who nonetheless appears to find greatest happiness in 
the enforced inactivity of his imprisonment, awaiting his execution at the end of Le 
Rouge et le noir. Thus, Rancière argues, the socially ambitious plebeian Julien ultimately 
realises his dream of emancipation not through the means-ends strategizing that drives 
him throughout the bulk of the novel, but when all such rational calculation is perforce 
suspended, leaving him in idle contemplation of the sky glimpsed from his prison cell. 
The novel thus plays off ‘deux manières de sortir de la sujétion plébéienne: par le 
renversement des positions ou par la suspension du jeu même de ces positions’ 
(Aisthesis, p.67). These two paths to emancipation are reflected in the structure of the 
novel’s narrative itself, Rancière maintains. On the one hand, there is the account of 
Julien’s attempts to secure social advancement, an account that depends on a purely 
rational cause and effect relationship between his character, his motivations, the 
strategies he therefore follows, and the effects such strategies have, given the objective 
social structures he must negotiate. On the other hand, the ‘pure succession d’actes’ 
which propel Julien to his fate – the letter of denunciation, the shot fired at Madame de 
Rénal, Julien’s passivity on being arrested, his final moments of true happiness in prison 
– seem to break with any clear logic of cause and effect. To quote Rancière: ‘Ainsi l’acte 
auquel aboutit tout le réseau des intrigues est aussi ce qui l’annule en ruinant toute 
stratégie des fins et des moyens, toute logique fictionnelle des causes et des effets’ 
(Aisthesis, p.65).  
 The happiness Julien feels in his prison derives precisely from the suspension of that 
logic of cause and effect and can be summed up in a simple formula: ‘jouir de cette 
qualité de l’expérience sensible que l’on atteint dès qu’on cesse de calculer, de vouloir et 
d’attendre, dès qu’on se résout à ne rien faire’ (Aisthesis, p.67). Julien’s calculated 
efforts at social advancement clearly reflect one of the effects of the French Revolution, 
namely the breakdown of the rigid hierarchies of the ancien régime and the opportunities 
for social mobility this unleashed. The source of Julien’s ultimate happiness is to be 
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found in what Rancière terms ‘l’autre aspect de la revolution égalitaire: la promotion de 
cette qualité de l’expérience sensible où l’on ne fait rien, qualité également offerte à 
ceux que l’ordre ancien séparait en hommes de jouissance et hommes de travail’ 
(Aisthesis, p.69). In the happiness Julien derives from his enforced inactivity, then, he 
experiences both the equality and the freedom whose promise Kant and Schiller had 
located in their respective aesthetic theories. 
 Rancière thus locates a tension at the core of Le Rouge et le noir and, by extension, 
at the heart of the nineteenth-century novel as a whole. As he argues, the historical 
coincidence of the realist novel and the emergence of the social sciences reflects a 
shared positivist faith in the possibility of providing a secular account of man’s place in 
the world through an objective description of social structures and institutions and their 
causal effects on a range of character types’ psychologies and trajectories. Cutting 
across this logic of rational causality are moments such as Julien’s happiness in his 
enforced inactivity, which serve to ‘substituer à l’avenir promis par la science sociale et 
l’action collective le pur non-sens de la vie, celui de la volonté obstinée qui ne veut rien’ 
(Aisthesis, p.75). Hence, according to Rancière, ‘le grand genre romanesque vient au 
jour mordu par son contraire, le bonheur de ne rien faire’, the moment of suspense in 
which is felt ‘le seul sentiment de l’existence […] sans souci des calculs de l’avenir’ 
(Aisthesis, p.76). The tension Rancière locates here in the nineteenth-century novel 
represents, in microcosm, one manifestation of a more fundamental ‘tension’, 
‘contradiction’, or ‘paradox’ intrinsic to the ‘aesthetic regime of art’. It is this ‘paradoxe 
fondateur’ (Malaise, p.51) that explains how Rancière can find in aesthetics a logic of 
‘suspense’, ‘idleness’, and ‘dissensus’, where a thinker like Moulier Boutang will find the 
opposite there, the promise of a consensual community of feeling, based on a re-
appropriation of productive labour. 
 
The ‘Paradoxe Fondateur’ of Aesthetics 
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Rancière traces this founding paradox of aesthetics back to German idealism and the 
manner in which it theorised the relationship between classical beauty and the values of 
ancient Greek community this was taken to express. As we have noted, for Rancière the 
‘idleness and indifferency’ Schiller attributes to the countenance of the Juno Ludovisi 
offers the promise of freedom and equality inasmuch as it figures ‘une forme sensible 
hétérogène par rapport aux formes ordinaires de l’expérience sensible’. Contemplation of 
the statute’s idleness engenders a sensible experience in the viewer that is 
heterogeneous because it suspends the conventional submission of the faculty of sense 
to the categories of rational understanding. In this it unleashes a ‘free play’ of the 
faculties that itself prefigures a form of political emancipation and equality in which the 
standard oppositions between a ruling elite, composed of men of action and reason, 
dominating a popular mass capable only of unreflexive sensation are themselves 
suspended. As Rancière explains: ‘La statue, comme la divinité, se tient en face du sujet, 
oisive, c’est-à-dire étrangère à tout vouloir, à toute combinaison des moyens et des fins’. 
This ‘free appearance’ and the ‘free play’ of the faculties it engenders in the viewer thus 
hold out ‘la promesse d’une humanité à venir, enfin accordée à la plénitude de son 
essence’ as a community of free and equal beings (Malaise, p.51). However, in a second 
move, the statue’s ‘free appearance’ is read as the expression of the freedom of the 
community that created it, a freedom contingent on the fact that ancient Greece 
supposedly knew no separation between art and everyday life, the statue being the 
direct translation into stone of ‘la croyance commune d’une communauté, identique à sa 
manière d’être même’ (p.52).  
 At the heart of the project of ‘aesthetic education’, central to German idealism, is, 
then, the attempt to make the forms of everyday life coincide with the forms of art, 
mimicking the model provided by ancient Greece. Yet, according to Rancière, this 
involves ‘une double suppression’ of the political stakes of the aesthetic, of the 
‘heterogeneous sensible’s’ capacity to figure a suspension of conventional hierarchies in 
a moment of ‘dissensus’. Firstly, the programme of ‘aesthetic education’, ‘fait évanouir 
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“l’esthétique” de la politique, la pratique de la dissensualité politique’, proposing in its 
place ‘la formation d’une communauté “consensuelle” […], une comunauté réalisée 
comme communauté du sentir’. Secondly, in order to achieve this, ‘il faut aussi 
transformer le “libre jeu” en son contraire, en l’activité d’un esprit conquérant qui 
supprime l’autonomie de l’apparence esthétique, en transformant toute apparence 
sensible en manifestation de sa propre autonomie’ (Malaise, p.54). German idealism’s 
programme of aesthetic education thus corresponds to what Rancière terms a 
‘metapolitics’ that seeks to effect in reality and in the sensible order a task that ordinary 
politics can only achieve formally, at the level of appearance, as the descent of the 
French Revolution into the Terror seemed to prove. 
 These ‘metapolitical’ assumptions would subsequently be taken up and adapted in 
Marxism, as evidenced in the conviction that since democratic politics was a mere 
shadow play driven by the hidden forces of the economic infrastructure, genuine 
revolution would require that infrastructure be revolutionised, so as to ‘donner à 
l’homme ce dont il n’avait jamais eu que l’apparence’ (Malaise, p.55). The problem with 
such metapolitical assumptions, at the level of politics itself, is that they rest on an 
opposition between an intellectual elite, which grasps the objective truth of society’s 
laws of functioning, and a mass of people defined by their ignorance or ‘misrecognition’ 
of those objective laws. In so doing, metapolitics institutionalises the precise hierarchical 
opposition whose suspension is figured in the ‘free play’ of the faculties inherent to the 
aesthetic. At the level of the arts, meanwhile, such metapolitical assumptions lead to 
artists and critics attributing ‘une fonction éthique’ to the artworks they produce or 
interpret (Aisthesis, p.178).  
 Rancière argues that this ‘ethical’ conception of the role of art can be found at work in 
movements as apparently diverse as the Arts and Crafts Movement, the Futurists, the 
Werkbund, Bauhaus, and the Soviet Constructivists. Despite their differing political 
positions and stylistic preferences, what all these movements share, he maintains, is an 
effort to remodel the forms of life according to the forms of art, they all seek ‘la 
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reconfiguration d’un monde sensible commun à partir d’un travail sur ses éléments de 
base, sur la forme des objets de la vie quotidienne’.12 For all these diverse artistic 
movements, then, the role of the artist was analogous to that of the architect, the 
engineer, or the sociologist as an ‘observateur engagé qui analyse les formes de vie 
individualisée produite par les nouvelles structures économiques et les formes de vie 
collective à promouvoir pour remettre les formes de l’individualité en harmonie avec les 
exigences d’une communauté’ (Aisthesis, p.179). It is, of course, precisely this role that 
Moulier Boutang adopts in his analyses of Post-Fordist labour. He seeks to describe the 
‘nouvelles structures économiques’ that are shaping the alienated forms of life of 
contemporary workers and citizens. He then imagines a particular kind of aesthetic 
experience that might ‘remettre les formes de l’individualité en harmonie avec les 
exigences d’une communauté’. In so doing, Moulier Boutang betrays his reliance on what 
Rancière would term an ‘ethical’ conception of the aesthetic. This is a conception based 
on what, in a reference to the Soviet artistic avant-garde of the 1920s, Rancière 
describes as ‘la suppression conjointe de la dissensualité politique et de l’hétérogénéité 
esthétique dans la construction des formes de vie et des édifices de la vie nouvelle’ 
(Malaise, p.55). 
 Against this ethical suppression of the heterogeneous sensible, then, Rancière seeks 
to defend the aesthetic’s capacity to figure moments of suspension of, rupture or 
dissensus within the conventional hierarchies of experience, dependent precisely on the 
unmotivated, idle nature of aesthetic experience. The term ‘ethical’, for Rancière, is 
always negatively connoted, as is the possibility that artists might play an analogous role 
to sociologists. He has defined the ethical as ‘la pensée qui établit l’identité entre un 
environnement, une manière d’être et un principe d’action’ (Malaise, p.146). As we have 
noted at some length, for Rancière emancipatory politics always takes the form of a 
suspension of any such presumed ‘identity’ between a social environment, a way of 
being, and a capacity for a particular kind of action. For example, the worker-
intellectuals he studies in La Nuit des prolétaires all challenge any simple ‘identity’ 
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between the environment they inhabit as workers and their presumed inability to engage 
in artistic creation or philosophical speculation. The ethical thus plays an analogous 
function for Rancière to that he attributes to sociology, a discipline that emerged in the 
wake of the democratic revolutions and sought to ‘remake a body for society […], to 
reconstitute the social fabric such that individuals and groups at a given place would 
have the ethos, the ways of feeling and thinking, which corresponded at once to their 
place and to a collective harmony’.13 To both the ethical conception of the aesthetic and 
to a sociology that assigns individuals and groups to specific social categories, assuming 
a simple causal link between those categories and their inherent capacities for thought 
and action, Rancière opposes a conception of emancipatory politics as a politics of 
rupture or dissensus. He focuses on those moments when any such fixed identities are 
suspended in a claim to an equality and a freedom regardless of ascribed status, class, 
or condition, as exemplified by proletarians who engage in philosophical speculation 
despite their long working day, women who claim equality despite their supposed 
biological or maternal function, immigrants who claim full citizenship despite their 
apparent ethnic difference. Agents and groups thus become political subjects through a 
‘processus de subjectivation’ that is also ‘un processus de désidentification et de 
déclassification’.14 In the aesthetic, that experience of idle contemplation in which the 
human faculties are given ‘free play’, he finds these moments of ‘disidentification’, of 
dissensual, interruptive, egalitarian politics prefigured.  
 This is not to say that Rancière simply ignores the tendency of the aesthetic towards 
its ethical function, its drive to reconfigure a dissensual democratic community into a 
harmonious, consensual community of feeling. Rather he seeks to negotiate this 
‘paradoxe fondateur’ of the aesthetic regime of arts, by highlighting those moments of 
rupture or dissensus that work against the integrative, consensual logic of any possible 
community of aesthetic feeling. We have already encountered one example of this 
negotiation in his attempts to play off the emancipatory promise of Julien’s contented 
inactivity at the end of Le Rouge et le noir against the novel’s realist depiction of post-
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revolutionary French social structures and the strategies and rational calculations these 
inspire in its ambitious hero. Another example can be found in Rancière’s commentary 
on Charlie Chaplin’s film, Modern Times (1936).  
 
Chaplin Tilting at Windmills 
As Rancière notes, the Constructivist Alexander Rodchenko promoted Chaplin to the 
status of ‘héros du nouveau monde mécanique, entre Lénine et Edison’, on the basis of 
his apparent ability to incarnate a harmonious aesthetic reconciliation between the forms 
of Fordist assembly-line labour and the forms of modern life (Aisthesis, p.241). Yet, 
Rancière argues, this is a one-sided interpretation of a character whom commentators 
like Rodchencko frequently also criticised for giving in to moments of sentimentality that 
seemed anachronistic in view of the role of ‘automate’ or ‘biomécanicien’ they wanted 
him to incarnate. These moments of sentimental anachronism are precisely what interest 
Rancière; they represent moments when Chaplin refuses to be integrated into any new 
community of feeling congruent with the new machine age. For Rancière, even Chaplin’s 
apparent adaptation to the rhythms of assembly-line labour corresponds to a kind of 
suspension of the will, to a series of mindless repetitive gestures whose effects undo any 
simple logic of cause and effect, means and pre-programmed end. Chaplin is thus a 
‘virtuose de la maladresse qui rate tout ce qu’il réussit et réussit tout ce qu’il rate’; he is 
‘un habitant exemplaire d’un nouvel univers sensible, celui de l’âge des machines qui 
accomplissent et nient en même temps la volonté et les fins car elles ne se prêtent à ses 
entreprises qu’en lui imposant en retour la répétition entêtée d’un mouvement dont la 
perfection propre est de ne rien vouloir lui-même’. In this Chaplin brings to the screen 
the very ‘vertu paradoxale’ that Schiller located in the expression of ‘idleness and 
indifferency’ on the face of the Juno Ludovisi, ‘la vertu de ne rien faire’ (Aisthesis, 
p.241). The art of Chaplin is thus to be found at those moments not when ‘la mécanique 
obéit’ but rather ‘là où elle se détraque, où se brouille le rapport du commandement à 
l’exécution, du vivant au mécanique et de l’actif au passif’ (Aisthesis, p.240). 
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 Thus, Rancière concludes, ‘les artistes constructeurs de l’avenir’ attempt in vain to see 
‘dans la gestique du petit homme le symbole d’un art synchrone avec la grande épopée 
de la machine, du travail taylorisé et de l’homme aux gestes exacts’. What Chaplin’s 
‘gestique’ actually communicates is ‘l’exacte identité de la précision machinique et de la 
lutte contre les moulins’ (Aisthesis, p.242). Chaplin, then, is far from representing the 
embodiment of that dream of a harmonious relationship between the new forms of 
machine-age economic life and the forms of art, the dream central to the Soviet avant-
garde’s ethical conception of the aesthetic. He is, like Don Quixote, an anachronism, 
whose crumpled suit, bowler hat, and clumsy gait, whose moments of sentimentality and 
unthinking repetitive gestures put a spanner in the works of the ‘grande épopée de la 
machine’, suspending its hierarchies of command and execution, activity and passivity, 
reason and sense. In so doing, he also upsets the hierarchy between the enlightened 
Soviet artist-engineer and the unthinking masses that underpins Constructivism. This 
hierarchy is, according to Rancière, merely an updated version of the founding hierarchy 
of any metapolitics, of the opposition established in the Republic’s parable of the cave 
between the Platonic philosopher-king who knows the truth and the masses who, 
mistaking the shadows on the cave wall for reality, languish in a state of ignorance. 
Chaplin, then, manages to ‘renvoyer la puissance démiurgique des machines au jeu des 
ombres sur les murs de la caverne, au prix peut-être que ces ombres se révèlent plus 
exactes et plus lucides que les plans des ingénieurs de l’avenir’ (Aisthesis, p.243). 
 In drawing this improbable analogy between Chaplin and Don Quixote, Rancière 
highlights the importance he attaches to the possibility of anachronism. For him, 
anachronism is what any history of mentalities must reject or repress in order to 
maintain its founding assumption that there is a simple identity, a direct causal 
relationship between a historical period, an objectively definable set of material 
circumstances, and the thoughts and actions available to those who inhabit that period 
and those circumstances. Anachronism must also be rejected by any historicist Marxism, 
which will assume that agents’ capacity to think and act is causally related to the stage 
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of economic development of the society they inhabit. For Rancière, on the other hand, to 
repress the possibility of anachronism is to refuse to think the conditions of possibility of 
any historical ‘event’ per se. Events happen, he maintains, when someone speaks out of 
place or acts in anachronistic or untimely fashion.  
 The historical and social sciences, however, seek to establish an identity between a 
definable set of material conditions and the actions, thoughts, or words these conditions 
are presumed to enable given agents to produce. As such, these disciplines are based on 
‘l’élaboration d’une pensée non-événementielle du temps, d’un temps libéré de 
l’anachronisme de la parole et de l’événement’.15 To refuse to think the possibility of the 
event is, for Rancière, to refuse to think the possibility of emancipation since the latter 
must be thought ‘à partir de son intempestivité, qui signifie deux choses: premièrement 
l’absence de nécessité historique qui fonde son existence; deuxièmement son 
hétérogénéité au regard des formes d’expérience structurées par le temps de la 
domination’ (Moments, p.231). As this article has attempted to show, it is in the idleness 
of an aesthetic gaze, freed from historical necessity and heterogeneous to the 
conventional hierarchies according to which reason dominates sense, that Rancière finds 
the possibility of any such emancipation prefigured. In this sense, his approach defines 
itself by its opposition to the kind of ethical conception of the relationship between 
aesthetics and politics, which locates the possibility of emancipation in the aesthetic’s 
promise of a harmonious relationship between the new forms of economic life and new 
forms of collective life, modelled on the forms of art. 
 Rancière thus allows us to identify in Moulier Boutang’s work the presence of merely 
the latest iteration of the ethical conception of art, with its associated project of aesthetic 
education. Where the Constructivists sought aesthetic and political revolution in the 
reconciliation of the forms of everyday life with the economic structures of Fordism, 
Moulier Boutang seeks an equivalent revolution and reconciliation, updated to reflect the 
economic structures of Post-Fordism. As we have seen, Rancière opposes to this ethical 
conception of the aesthetic, an emphasis on the aesthetic as a fleeting moment of 
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idleness, in which conventional conceptual and political hierarchies are disrupted or 
suspended. The fleeting nature of this conception of political emancipation is the source 
of the most frequent criticism levelled at his work, namely that such moments constitute 
fragile grounds for any lasting collective political movements and that his work hence 
pays insufficient attention to the material conditions that respectively constrain or enable 
those more durable forms of political agency. It is, of course, this kind of assumption of 
a causal relationship between material conditions and political agency that underpins the 
work of neo-operaists like Moulier Boutang and the updated projects of ‘aesthetic 
education’ they implicitly endorse. The onus is therefore surely on Rancière’s critics to 
demonstrate how their calls for a greater attentiveness to these supposedly causal 
relationships between material conditions and political agency do not simply reenact the 
‘suppression of dissensus’ that Rancière argues is inherent to any such metapolitical 
project. It is surely significant in this light that, in his most recent work, Maurizio 
Lazzarato, formerly one of Moulier Boutang’s close collaborators, seems to have moved 
much closer to Rancière’s position on this issue. As we noted earlier in this article, 
Lazzarato’s break with theories of ‘cognitive capitalism’ has obliged him to seek 
alternative paths to emancipation than that supposedly offered by the promise of a 
collective re-appropriation of the cognitive and affective capacities now integrated into 
the productive process. This, in turn, has led him to return to the refusal of work as a 
primary political tactic, yet this is a notion of refusal that bears the traces of a significant 
engagement with Rancière’s thought. 
 Thus Lazzarato now understands the refusal of work to correspond to the kind of 
‘suspension’ of or ‘disidentification’ from fixed or assigned social identities that Rancière 
argues is both central to the politics of emancipation and prefigured in the aesthetic 
experience. The strike proved an effective form of the refusal of work, Lazzarato argues, 
‘parce qu’elle bloquait la valorisation du capital, mais aussi parce qu’elle rendait les 
ouvriers “égaux” en les faisant sortir d’une division du travail dans laquelle ils étaient 
assignés à des fonctions et des places différentes et concurrentes’ (Dette, p.201). He 
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combines this re-reading of the operaist refusal of work not only with Rancière’s 
aesthetics of idleness, but also with Paul Lafargue’s Droit à la paresse, to assert that 
‘l’action “paresseuse” est un opérateur de désidentification’ (Dette, p.205). It is this 
capacity for ‘disidentification’, rather than any identity conferred by one’s position in the 
relations of production, that enables political agency: ‘ce n’est pas le cognitif ou 
l’immatériel ou toute autre définition tirée de la production qui qualifie l’action politique, 
mais le refus et la capacité de fuir les catégories, les identités, les rôles de la division 
sociale du travail et d’ouvrir des possibles. Le refus et son potentiel d’action politique ne 
sont pas directement déductibles du “travail”, de la place et des fonctions auxquelles 
nous sommes assignées’ (Dette, p.207). Thus, Lazzarato concludes, ‘l’action paresseuse 
ne requiert aucune virtuosité, aucun savoir-faire spécialisé, cognitif ou professionnel. Elle 
peut être exercée par tout le monde’ (Dette, p.207). 
 Lazzarato has come quite a long way here in challenging and reformulating one of the 
founding assumptions of operaism. For in Tronti’s original formulation, the power of 
refusal was read as a direct expression of the workers’ position in the relations of 
production, of their status as an inherently antagonistic force integrated within ‘the 
system of capitalism […] independent of it and opposed to it’ (Operai, p.34, my 
translation). This reformulation of operaism’s founding assumptions owes a considerable 
debt to Rancière. For, as we have seen, it is precisely this capacity to suspend one’s 
assignation to or identification with any fixed role or status, a capacity that is, at least 
virtually, open to anyone at all, that Rancière finds prefigured in the idleness of aesthetic 
contemplation. Lazzarato’s most recent work therefore suggests that he has joined 
Rancière in wagering that any political emancipation must be thought as an 
emancipation from work rather than an emancipation through work. 
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